Workfare programs require participants to work in order to obtain benefits. Such programs have been widely used for fighting poverty in crises such as macroeconomic or agroclimatic shocks in which large numbers of poor, able-bodied people have become unemployed.
1 Such interventions are relatively complex and difficult to evaluate. Other things being equal, the appraisal and design should be well informed and rigorous. But time is short in a crisis, and data are often far from ideal. What can be done to obtain a reasonably credible and yet rapid assessment of the likely gains to the poor from a given outlay on a workfare program?
This article offers a mini-manual for the rapid appraisal of an existing workfare program to determine if its expansion would be cost-effective. By "rapid appraisal" I mean that the work can be done by two people in about two weeks with the sort of data normally (though not invariably) available at short notice. Box 1 summarizes the data requirements. I assume that the appraisal must address two main questions: How much impact on poverty can be expected from outlays on the existing program? How might the program be modified to enhance the gains to the poor?
To illustrate, I consider two stylized versions of the programs found in practice. The first is in a middle-income country in which unemployment has risen sharply in the wake of a macroeconomic stabilization and reform program. The other is in a low-income country (or region) hit by a severe drought. I label the former country MINC (for "middle income") and the latter LINC (for "low income").
A rapid appraisal cannot normally quantify the distribution of benefits among the poor, so only the aggregate transfer from the budget is estimated here. I note, however, some of the qualitative ways in which sensitivity to distribution among the poor (notably by putting higher weight on gains to the poorest) can bear on the appraisal and design of the program. I also note the implications of attaching a high value to reducing poverty in terms of current incomes, as is often the case in a crisis.
The program's budget is taken to be predetermined. The issues are how costeffective the program is in raising the incomes of the poor, and how performance might be improved. Such cost-effectiveness calculations can be deceptive if the budget is not fixed. This can happen if the design of the program also affects the resources available, by influencing how generously the nonpoor support the program. External benefits that accrue to the nonpoor from the assets created can help mobilize broad public support. For example, insurance benefits to nonpoor participants were a factor in public support for workfare schemes in rural areas of South Asia (Ravallion 1991) .
2 However, it is unclear how important such considerations are in a crisis. I return to this point later.
A further limitation (in common with other estimates of cost-effectiveness) is that I largely ignore benefits that come in the form of better insurance. This limitation could well be serious because insurance against income losses is thought to be a significant benefit from workfare programs in practice (Ravallion 1991) . I do, however, consider ways in which program design can enhance risk benefits.
Any public program must be assessed relative to the best alternative use of the same resources. The best alternative will vary with country circumstances, including administrative capabilities. One option that is probably feasible everywhere is a uniform distribution of the program budget to every household (whether poor or not). If the transfer to the poor as a percentage of total spending on the program is less
Box 1. Data for a Rapid Appraisal
The rapid appraisal method proposed here requires information on
• The poverty rate in the relevant country or region • The wage rate of unskilled (informal sector) labor • The unemployment rate among the poor • The labor intensity of current workfare projects, their (financial) benefit-cost ratio, their cost recovery rate, and the extent to which the projects are targeted to poor areas.
The likely sources of this information are household or labor force surveys, the project's administrators (both central and local), and interviews with participants in the program.
than the percentage of households that are poor, then the uniform allocation is preferable. Of course, a workfare scheme that passes this test may still be inferior to some other option; in highly industrialized countries and some transition economies, for example, a well-designed unemployment insurance scheme might be feasible and more cost-effective (Wilson and Fretwell 1996) .
An Overview of the Programs
A workfare program can reduce poverty in two ways: by providing paid work for the unemployed from poor household, and by producing goods or services that poor families value. Workfare will naturally be more labor intensive than if the government simply maximized the present value of the assets created because the workfare program attaches positive value to employing poor people, independent of the gains to society as a whole from the outputs obtained. So a workfare program will tend to operate at a point where there is a tradeoff between the value of the assets created and employment (figure 1). The program will operate to the right of the point that maximizes the present value of the assets created. This tradeoff poses a difficult question: How much emphasis should be given to immediate employment versus creation of durable assets? The stylized program in MINC puts relatively more emphasis on the assets created than does the LINC scheme. Municipal governments in MINC appear to use the scheme as an extra source of funds for maintaining or upgrading minor roads, sanitation facilities, and so on, using roughly the same combination of labor and nonlabor inputs as is customary. For example, a number of subprojects entailed connecting new dwellings under construction (clearly for well-to-do households) to the sewerage system. In others, pavements were repaired in well-to-do neighborhoods. In LINC the subprojects are mainly minor roads, soil conservation, reforestation, and irrigation, and the technology used tends to be somewhat more labor intensive than that used in similar projects outside the workfare program.
In neither country are the subprojects targeted to poor communities per se. In MINC the projects are just as likely to be in nonpoor neighborhoods, and in LINC the beneficiaries of rural development projects are often relatively well-off local landowners. In both cases, the work done clearly has some value to the community at large, although the projects in LINC seem unikely to pass a conventional cost-benefit test. The municipal or provincial government usually provides cofinancing to cover the nonwage cost; local residents or nongovernmental organizations usually do not provide cofinancing. Cost recovery is rare, even from well-off beneficiaries.
The Arithmetic of Cost-Effectiveness
The share of the government's outlay that benefits the poor-the cost-effectiveness ratio-can be decomposed into various components that are either estimated from the available data or calibrated from plausible assumptions. Here I suggest a decomposition that I have found useful in practice, although there are other possibilities; my aim is to provide an example that can be adapted to specific circumstances.
The cost-effectiveness ratio can be decomposed exactly into five other variables: (i) Budget leverage. The government can require cofinancing from nonpoor neighborhoods for subprojects that will benefit them. Let government (central plus local) spending be G, and let this spending be leveraged up to result in a total budget of G + C, including private cofinancing (C ).
(ii) Labor intensity. Some of the participants may not be poor, so let the share of all wages paid in total operating cost be (W + L)/(G + C ), where W is the wage received by the poor and L denotes leakage to the nonpoor.
(iii) Targeted labor earnings. This is the proportion of the wages paid out to poor workers, W/(W + L).
(iv) Net wage gain. This is the share of the gross wage received by the poor after subtracting all costs of participation, including income forgone from other work.
The net wage gain is NW/W, where NW stands for wages net of forgone income or other costs of participation.
(v) Indirect benefit. Let IB denote the indirect benefits to the poor, such as when the assets created are local public goods in poor neighborhoods.
The total gain to the poor is B = NW + IB, which, as a proportion of public spending on the program, gives the cost-effectivness ratio:
It is useful to further decompose the indirect benefit to net wage ratio (IB/NW ) as:
This gives the net wage ratio as the product of a further three ratios: (vi) Targeted indirect benefits. Let the social benefits (to the whole population) from the assets created be SB. The share going to the poor is then IB/SB.
(vii) Benefit-to-cost ratio for the project. This is simply the ratio of SB to total cost, G + C.
(viii) The share of net wage gains in total cost. This can also be written in terms of three of the ratios in equation (1):
in which the labels iv, iii, and ii correspond to the ratios in equation (1). Some benefits, particularly the bulk of the indirect benefits, accrue in the future. One can also measure the cost-effectiveness ratio in terms of current benefits (CB) by replacing all values in these formulas with current values, or values within some specified period. I define the "current period" as the period during which indirect benefits are negligible.
In the above formulation, cost recovery from the nonpoor will increase the budget leverage ratio, (G + C)/G, but will not change other variables. One can explicitly introduce the cost recovery rate, k = C/ (SB -IB) , that is, the ratio of the privately financed component of the total cost to the amount of the total benefit that does not accrue to the poor. One can then obtain the following formula for the budget leverage ratio:
(vi) (vii) in which the labels vi and vii correspond to the ratios in equation (2).
Impact on Labor Earnings
In discussing how best to estimate plausible values for the cost-effectiveness ratio, I focus initially on the workfare scheme in MINC; with the basic ideas in place, the application to LINC will be straightforward. Let the data sources be the MINC Statistical Bureau (MSB) and the LINC Statistical Bureau (LSB).
There is a strong association between poverty and unemployment in MINC. Tabulations from the MSB's recent national sample survey indicate an unemployment rate of 40 percent in the poorest decile of households ranked by income per person, compared with 20 percent for all households. The unemployment rate falls steadily as income per person rises.
The Wage Rate
As is typically the case in workfare programs, no means test is applied. The scheme aims to self-select the poor and provide work for as many people as possible without undermining their incentive to take regular jobs when they are available. This approach will work if the workfare wage rate is low enough. (It should not be forgotten that the program has a budget constraint; increasing the wage rate for poor workers means that fewer poor people would benefit from the program.) A relatively low wage rate reduces the need to ration the number of workfare jobs and so enhances the risk benefits to poor people by providing a reliable fallback in times of need (Ravallion 1991; Ravallion, Datt, and Chaudhuri 1993) .
The statutory minimum wage in MINC is $250 a month, well above the current monthly workfare rate of $200. (As an emergency employment program targeted to the poor, workfare is exempt from the minimum wage rate statute.) The minimum wage, however, may also be above the market wage, given that enforcement is difficult in most developing countries. So how does the workfare wage compare with the market wages received by the poor?
In the poorest 10 percent of MINC households (ranked by household income per person), the average monthly earnings for the principal job (when it entailed at least 35 hours of work a week) were $330, well above the workfare wage. The poorest decile received the lowest average wage among all deciles. Average wages for the second poorest and all higher deciles were more than double the workfare wage. On the basis of these data, it is reasonable to assume that the prevailing workfare wage will be unattractive to anyone who is not considered poor in MINC, and it is unlikely to attract poor workers out of their current job.
Net Wage Gain
The net wage gain (NW/W ) is probably the most difficult variable to estimate in equation (1) and, possibly for this reason, it is often set to unity. This would be justified if labor supply for a workfare scheme came only from unemployment and if no other participation costs were incurred by the poor. But this assumption is difficult to accept. Poor people cannot afford to be idle. Some time will be devoted to informal, often family-run, farms or other enterprises. (This is less work than needed, but it still creates some income.) Even if all workers were unemployed at the time they joined the scheme, they would not necessarily have remained unemployed had the program not existed. Even a worker who has been unemployed for some time typically faces a positive probability of finding extra work, including selfemployment or some informal sector activity. Joining the program will leave less time for search. So the net income gain will be lower than the gross wage rate paid. How much lower?
Consider a typical unemployed poor worker who is searching for a job at the time the program is opened. Without the program, the worker faces a probability P * of finding extra work of some sort, at a wage W * . So expected earnings without the program are P * W * . (One can interpret P * as the proportion of time in which work would otherwise be found during the workfare period.)
Now introduce the workfare program. Let the probability of finding alternative work while working on the program be P (which may not be the same as P * ). The workfare wage is W. The expected income gain when the program becomes available is then PW * + (1 -P)W. So the expected net wage gain (NW ) to workers from introducing the scheme is:
Suppose, for example, that joining the scheme means that the worker can no longer search for a regular job and hence has zero chance of getting one (P = 0). Then the expected gain is W -P * W * , that is, the program's wage minus expected earnings from finding a regular job. The example does not seem plausible in this setting, however. The worker can still search in nonwork hours, and participation in workfare may help in getting a regular job (by the extra experience and possibly the extra knowledge of work opportunities) sufficiently to compensate for the lost search time.
So suppose instead that joining the scheme has no effect one way or the other on the probability of finding regular work; P * = P. Then the expected gain is (1 -P)W, that is, the proportion of the worker's time that would otherwise be unemployed times the wage rate.
In one special case, the calculation of net wage gain is greatly simplified. This occurs when no extra nonworkfare employment is available to the poor with or without the program, that is, P * = P = 0. Then any income forgone by a workfare participant will be made up by an equal gain to a poor nonparticipant. Employment for the poor is then a zero-sum game. Because poor workers as a whole will forgo no income, NW/W = 1. It appears that this special case of zero forgone income is often (at least implicitly) assumed in discussions of workfare schemes. But zero forgone income does not seem plausible on a priori grounds, even for the poor as a whole, as discussed earlier.
What are reasonable assumptions for MINC? As already noted, the MSB survey indicated that 40 percent of those in the poorest decile were unemployed. If a worker in the poorest decile who is choosing between the program and the labor market does not accept a workfare job, he will no doubt find some work. Assuming that he has the average probability of being employed at the average wage received by workers in that decile, he will be employed 60 percent of the time at a monthly rate of $330. His expected wage if he does not accept employment through workfare is then about $200. So the current wage rate in the program of $200 turns out to be the minimum expected wage needed to attract the average worker in the poorest decile out of unemployment.
This calculation is based on averages. Actual gains to participating workers will be distributed around these averages; some workers will face relatively low chances of finding a full-time job or even casual part-time work while searching for a full-time job. Such workers will find the workfare wage rate more attractive. There are also regional differences; the same wage will be more (less) attractive in low-cost (highcost) regions, and unemployment rates will differ from region to region. The gains from workfare will be found among those who face below-average prospects of other employment, or below-average wage rates-or both-or who live in areas where the cost of living is relatively low.
With such a high average unemployment rate in the poorest deciles, it is not unreasonable to presume that participants face unusually low prospects of finding full-time work during their spell of workfare employment. How much lower is hard to say. If program participants in MINC face a 50 percent higher unemployment rate than the poorest decile, then P = 0.4. Also assume that joining the program has no effect on the probability of finding a regular job. So the expected net benefit for those joining the workfare program will be 60 percent of the program wage rate. This is close to data-based estimates on the net wage ratio for an Argentinean workfare program that was implemented in 1997 (Jalan and Ravallion 1998) .
The Cost-Effectiveness of the MINC Program
One can now make a rapid appraisal of the cost-effectiveness of the workfare program in MINC. Because private cofinancing is negligible, I set C = 0. The central government's accounts indicate that its own contributions (entirely for workfare jobs) represented one-third of total cost, so (W + L)/(G + C) = 1/3. Because the MINC wage rate discussed earlier is very unlikely to be attractive to people who are not poor, I set L = 0. From the data and assumptions discussed in the previous section, I have assumed that NW/W = 0.6. Then NW/(G + C) = 0.2.
Because MINC makes no explicit attempt to target poor areas, the poor are as likely as the nonpoor to benefit indirectly from the projects; so IB/SB = 0.2 (the poverty rate in MINC). The projects in MINC produce benefits sufficient to cover their cost; SB/(G + C) = 1. (This reflects the fact that the labor intensity is about the average for similar public works projects.) Together, these assumptions yield B/NW = 2. Later I consider alternative assumptions.
Combining these numbers, the value of B/G implied by equation (1) is 0.40. Equivalently, it takes $2.50 to increase incomes of the poor by $1. Assuming that all of the indirect benefit is in the future, the CB/G ratio is 0.20, so it takes $5 to transfer $1 to the poor today.
Because the poverty rate in MINC is 20 percent, the B/G estimate of 0.40 is double the share that poor people would obtain from a uniform, untargeted allocation of the same budget across the whole population (in which everyone gets about the same amount, whether poor or not). In terms of its impact on the current incomes of the poor, however, the workfare scheme does no better or worse than a uniform lumpsum transfer to all households, whether poor or not.
The LINC Program
The LINC scheme operates primarily in rural areas. Unlike in MINC, poverty and unemployment (at least as conventionally measured) are not strongly correlated in LINC. Indeed, data from the LSB indicate that unemployment rates rise as income rises, starting with the poorest, peaking at about the middle of the distribution, and falling thereafter. Substantial underemployment is thought to exist among the poorest families, however; a worker might be classified as employed, yet work for only half the week.
As in MINC, there is no private cost recovery (C = 0). The wage rate in the LINC program is tied to a statutory minimum wage rate for agricultural labor that is well above the prevailing wage rate for casual unskilled agricultural labor. The high workfare wage rate thus attracts participants who are not poor or unemployed. As a result, workfare jobs are heavily rationed. Anecdotal evidence from field trips suggests that when deciding who gets work, local program administrators do not always favor the poorest, either deliberately or because they do not know who is poor. So, unlike MINC, there is definite leakage to the nonpoor in LINC, although the forgone income is probably lower than in MINC. I assume 0.75 for both the targeting of earnings [W/(W + L)] and the net wage gain (NW/W ). This is consistent with an estimate of forgone income in an Indian workfare program (Datt and Ravallion 1994) .
The indirect benefits to the poor are clearly smaller in LINC than in MINC; the nonpoor landowners capture the bulk of the benefits from the assets created. The poor do receive some indirect benfits, however, notably through second-round effects on employment from higher farm productivity. I assume that the poor obtain one-fourth of the indirect benefits from the program. The high labor intensity means, however, that the social benefits are only sufficient to cover one-half of the cost.
On plugging these numbers into equation (1), LINC's value of B/G is almost identical to that for MINC, 0.41, and the cost of transferring $1 to the poor is also about $2.50 under LINC's program. As in MINC, it is unlikely that any of the indirect benefits will raise current incomes (within a few months, say). The current benefit ratio is 0.28 (this is CB/G, as given by the value of B/G when IB = 0). So it costs $3.55 to increase the current earnings of the poor by $1 with LINC's program. Recall that the poverty rate in LINC is 50 percent. So the absolute gain to the poor from an untargeted allocation of the same gross budget is higher than the gain from the program. Table 1 summarizes the cost-effectiveness calculations for these two stylized programs under the base-case assumptions discussed above. (Costs are rounded off to the nearest $0.10.) Note: The poverty rate is assumed to be 20 percent in the middle-income country and 50 percent in the lowincome country.
Comparisons with Other Safety Net Operations
One must be cautious in comparing these estimates with cost-effectiveness ratios for other programs because the numbers are often not strictly comparable. For example, the numbers in table 1 include forgone incomes, but these are often ignored in other estimates of cost-effectiveness ratios. There are also systematic differences in the target group; for example, workfare reaches able-bodied adults, while child nutrition programs do not directly do so; rather than choosing between them, a government may need both types of program to provide a comprehensive safety net.
Assessments of safety net programs in several middle-and low-income countries show a wide range of cost-effectiveness. For cash transfer programs in Eastern Europe, Subbarao and others (1997: table 3 .5) present estimates of the proportion of the public transfer going to the poor ranging from 19 to 58 percent. The same source (table 4. 2) also estimates the leakage to the nonpoor from targeted food programs for several developing countries. The proportion of the total transfer to the poor ranges from 19 to 93 percent. The latter figure is an outlier; excluding it, the range is 19 to 69 percent. For food subsidy programs in India, Radhakrishna and others (1997) estimate that the share of expenditure reaching the poor is 16 to 19 percent. For housing subsidies in various countries, Subbarao and others (1997: table 4 .5) estimate the share going to households below the median income at between 10 and 50 percent.
This wide range of experience makes generalizations difficult. But in terms of the impact of my stylized workfare programs on current incomes, one might well do worse with other instruments, particularly subsidies to goods for which demand rises with income. One could probably do better, however, or at least no worse, with an untargeted lump-sum transfer. Factoring in the estimated future income gains to the poor, the workfare programs start to look better than many other safety net operations, including untargeted lump-sum transfers, in MINC but not in LINC.
Risk Benefits
The benefits from lowering the risk of reduced income are rarely factored into calculations of cost-effectiveness. How would their inclusion affect these comparisons? The risk benefits from a good workfare program can be large, as has often been demonstrated in famines (Ravallion 1997a) . Even in normal times, existing (market and nonmarket) arrangements for insurance leave poor people exposed to risk (see, for example, Jalan and Ravallion, forthcoming). The risk benefits depend on the degree of risk aversion and the effect of the safety net on the riskiness of incomes, which will depend in turn on how flexibly the program responds to changing household circumstances. In this respect, some safety net programs are quite unresponsive and therefore are as ineffective as insurance; ration cards for subsidized foods, for example, are often held for long periods and are hard to get quickly. Workfare schemes are more responsive to income risk provided the work is easily obtained when needed. That will depend on wage rates and the budget. If the wage is set so high that jobs are heavily rationed (given the available budget), the scheme will not provide reliable insurance for the poor. This is more of a concern in LINC, yet its risk-prone rural economy is a setting in which protection is greatly needed. Insurance is difficult for the poor to obtain without incurring unacceptably high costs (including lost opportunities for escaping poverty in the longer term through potentially risky investments in human and physical capital). A full accounting of the risk benefits would probably make the MINC scheme look better but would have less effect on the calculations for LINC.
Options for Enhancing Performance
Rapid appraisals can also indicate ways in which the program's impact on poverty might be improved. Box 2 provides a checklist of recommendations for a costeffective workfare scheme.
Box 2. Elements of a Good Workfare Program
• The wage rate should be no higher than the market wage for unskilled manual labor in agriculture or the informal sector during a normal year in the setting in which the program is introduced.
• Restrictions on eligibility or other forms of rationing should be avoided; ideally the only requirement for eligibility should be the fact that work is wanted at this wage rate.
• If rationing is unavoidable (because demand for work exceeds the budget available at the wage set), then the program should be targeted to poor areas and confined to the time periods in which hardship appears to be greatest. Flexibility should be allowed in future budget allocations, however, to reflect any revealed differences in demand for the scheme.
• The labor intensity (share of wage bill in total cost) should be higher than normal for similar projects in the same setting. How much higher will depend on the relative importance attached to immediate income gains versus (income and other) gains to the poor from the assets created. This proportion will vary from setting to setting.
• The subprojects should be targeted to poor areas to ensure that the assets created are of maximum value to poor people. Any exceptions-in which the assets largely benefit the nonpoorshould require co-financing from the beneficiaries, and this money should go back into the workfare budget.
• Performance should be monitored using careful evaluation.
The Wage Rate
The wage rate for the MINC program seems about right, but the LINC wage is too high given the budget. As a result the LINC program has fewer jobs to offer than it could have, and the jobs that are available often do not go to the poor. A wage rate that is no higher than the market wage for unskilled agricultural labor in a normal agricultural year will reduce leakage, provide wider coverage of the poor with the current budget, provide better insurance, and protect incentives to take up normal work when it becomes available. It can be safely assumed that anyone who is willing to do unskilled manual labor for that wage in LINC is poor. So (assuming that the other ratios are unchanged), this alteration to the LINC program would bring the benefit ratio up to 0.50 and reduce the cost of a $1 gain to the poor to $2; LINC's workfare program would then do as well as a uniform lump-sum transfer. The current benefit ratio (CB/G) would rise to 0.375-still less than a lump-sum transfer. Organized labor is likely to resist this reform, arguing that the government cannot undercut its own statutory minimum wage rate (although this wage is not enforceable). Labor unions in MINC initially took the same position, but the counterargument-that an exception should be made for emergency programs-won the day there.
Cost Recovery
Another way to enhance the scheme's impact on poverty is to introduce cost recovery for the benefits accruing to the nonpoor. If costs are recovered at a rate of 25 percent (but all other assumptions of the base case are retained), the value of B/G in MINC rises to 0.50, bringing the cost of transferring $1 to the poor down to $2. For LINC, B/G = 0.45. At a cost recovery rate of 50 percent, the value of B/G in MINC reaches 0.67, bringing the cost of an extra $1 to the poor down to $1.50. In LINC, a cost recovery rate of 50 percent is enough for B/G to reach 0.50. At a cost recovery rate of 75 percent, the cost of transferring $1 to the poor falls to $1 in MINC and to about $1.75 in LINC. Clearly, such initiatives could greatly improve program performance in reaching the poor in both countries.
Labor Intensity
Increasing the share of outlays spent on labor can greatly enhance the effectiveness of workfare programs in raising current incomes of the poor. The labor share for some projects in MINC is very low; about one-fifth are electricity and gas projects, with an average labor share of 10 percent. If these were entirely privately cofinanced, the low labor share would not be a concern. More typically, however, such projects, to be justified, would have to yield large indirect benefits to the poor, and that they should do so seems unlikely. Data for MINC indicate that by dropping these projects, the overall labor share would be 0.40, implying that B/G = 0.44; this would mean that it would cost $2.27 (instead of $2.50) to transfer $1 to the poor through the scheme. Indeed, if the MINC program had the labor intensity of the LINC program, and all other characteristics were the same as in table 1, the value of B/G would rise to 0.50, again reducing the cost of a $1 transfer to the poor to $2.
Recall, however, that there is a tradeoff between higher labor intensity and the indirect benefits from the program in both countries. As illustrated in figure 1, a workfare scheme will operate at labor intensities that entail a tradeoff between (W + L) and SB. So raising the labor intensity will lower the social benefits. For the sake of argument, suppose that a labor share of two-thirds in MINC was enough to drive the social benefits from the projects down to zero. Then B/NW = 1. With the other ratios unchanged, the value of B/G would be 0.40, exactly what it is in the current scheme. So as long as it is possible to cover at least some of the cost of the scheme from the outputs generated with a labor intensity as high as that in LINC, it would be better to switch to a more labor-intensive scheme.
Even given the seemingly steep tradeoff with indirect benefits, a more laborintensive program could be more effective in reducing poverty. The case is even stronger when aiming for high current transfers to the poor.
Restrictions on Eligibility
The MINC program restricts eligibility to heads of households. By constraining the family's own adjustment, however, such restrictions may actually reduce the program's effectiveness. For example, insisting that only the head of the household can join the program will reduce the net gain to poor families to the extent that other household members have less attractive labor market options and therefore lower forgone income. The best way to raise the net transfer benefit is to let poor households rearrange their own activities so as to take advantage of the workfare scheme.
Designing a Program to Enhance Indirect Benefits to the Poor
Field trips to poor areas and discussions with local residents revealed plenty of scope for worthwhile community infrastructure projects in both MINC and LINC. It is not unreasonable to expect (pecuniary and nonpecuniary) benefits to poor people from such projects.
To illustrate the implications for the cost-effectiveness calculations, suppose that the value of the indirect benefits to poor communities from the subprojects in MINC rose to half the total benefits. Keeping all other assumptions the same, B/NW would rise to 2.25, and the overall B/G ratio would rise to 0.70. Thus the cost of transfer-ring $1 to the poor would fall by more than 40 percent-from $2.50 to about $1.40. Under the same assumption, the cost of a $1 transfer to the poor in LINC would fall to $1.90. If at the same time the social benefits could be increased to cover threefourths of the cost (still a conventional benefit-to-cost ratio under 1), a $1 gain to the poor in LINC would cost about $1.50.
Sound project selection is crucial to achieving higher indirect benefits from the assets created by workfare. Technical corroboration of the subproject's viability helps; Is it likely to work on purely technical, engineering grounds? The ex ante appraisal should, however, consider other factors likely to make the indirect benefits more pro-poor. Appraisers can identify subprojects likely to be of value to poor people and reward these using a point system, allowing subprojects to compete for funds. Census-based poverty indicators, for instance, are available at the local level in both middle-and low-income countries. Higher points should then be given to subprojects from poor areas. A municipality's past success in completing subprojects can also be rewarded with extra points. The point system could also be used to give an incentive to municipal governments in nonpoor areas that are willing to fully finance subprojects in their areas.
Direct community involvement in determining what project is to be funded and how it is to be implemented is highly desirable. This input can serve as a source of information on the likely benefits to the area and as an indicator of the subproject's longer-term sustainability. It can also help avoid "program capture" by local elites. If a bona fide local community group confirms that the subproject is valuable (even aside from the direct employment benefits), extra points should be allocated.
Other design features can enhance the value of the assets created. Relying as far as possible on workers in the same community as the project will probably improve the quality of the work because the beneficiaries have a personal longer-term interest. A bonus, contingent on successful completion to a standard that can be verified, would also help.
In all cases, the central government must rely on the existing fiscal structure. Systemic factors are likely to influence the ability of some provinces to reach poor areas; for example, budget constraints can mean that poorer provinces will have a harder time targeting their own poor areas (Ravallion 1997b) . Central government incentives to improve performance and provide technical assistance in proposing viable projects at the local level could help. Progress in placing subprojects in poor areas is not difficult to monitor, although this will be easier in MINC, where the statistical system is better developed.
When a points system is used and both project selection and the budget allocation are decentralized, a check should be made for horizontal inequality between areas in the minimum number of points for a subproject to be accepted. If there are large differences, then reallocations of the budget may be called for, with more money going to areas where the minimum points needed for project acceptance are higher. A good information system for monitoring projects can help in all these respects.
Conclusion
This article shows how to conduct rapid appraisals of workfare programs. For illustrative purposes, two programs are considered, one in a middle-income country and one in a low-income country. The programs are stylized versions of those found in practice. The cost of a $1 gain to the poor using the program is about $2.50 in both cases, although the components of that cost are quite different; the poor obtain higher gains in current earnings in the low-income country, reflecting the program's higher labor intensity. The cost of a $1 gain in current earnings is $5 for the middle-income country and $3.50 for the low-income country. The amount received by the poor from a given public outlay under the program is double what they would receive from a uniform (untargeted) transfer in the middle-income country, but the poor would receive more with such a lump-sum transfer than with workfare in the lowincome country. A comparison with the cost-effectiveness ratios of other types of safety net operations suggests that workfare schemes are more effective than poorly targeted food and housing subsidies but not as effective as other options. These comparisons may be deceptive, however; the same costs are not always considered, and the same options are not always feasible.
Selected reforms could enhance the benefits to the poor. It should be possible to switch to more labor-intensive production methods for subprojects in middleincome countries. There is also scope in both middle-and low-income countries for enhancing the indirect benefits to the poor from the assets created. Redistributive cofinancing-whereby cost recovery is applied only to asset creation in nonpoor areas-could also greatly improve cost-effectiveness.
Tradeoffs between some of these options are likely. In particular, too high a labor intensity will mean that the projects yield negligible indirect benefits. Circumstances will no doubt influence the choices made with respect to such a tradeoff. In a crisis situation, it is understandable that officials will opt for high labor intensity. In more normal times, where the political sustainability of the safety net is also an issue, indirect benefits will tend to get greater weight. The present calculations suggest that by any one of these routes-greater cost recovery from the nonpoor, higher labor intensity, or greater indirect benefits-design changes should make it possible to enhance appreciably the gains to the poor from a given outlay.
It cannot be denied that these calculations are rough. Naturally, the more rapid the appraisal, the more assumptions will be needed to make up for missing data. This type of appraisal is no substitute for a rigorous evaluation of a program after it has been implemented, but it can help inform public choice and program design. It can also help identify key areas where further data and analysis would have a high return.
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1. On the arguments for and against workfare programs, see Ravallion 1991; Besley and Coate 1992; Ravallion and Datt 1995; Lipton and Ravallion 1995, section 6; Mukherjee 1997; 2. An example is the Sri Lankan food stamp scheme: a better-targeted program (with the poor getting a higher share of the budget) was introduced, but this subsequently undermined political support from the middle class, and the poor ended up with less than they had before the reforms. For further discussion of these and other issues of targeting, see Besley and Kanbur (1993) and van de Walle (1998) .
